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Seeing Is Believing?
Daniel Whistler and Daniel Hill ask what kind of harm religious symbols might cause
It is sometimes hard to see how religious symbols can harm us—and therefore how an ethics of
religious symbolism might be framed. Legal debates around the protection of freedoms and rights
still take their cue from J. S. Mill’s ‘one very simple principle’ that structures On Liberty: ‘The only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others’. It is for this reason that cases concerning religious
symbols heard in Strasbourg under Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights
(protecting ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’) often involve an analysis of the types of
harm that such symbols are likely to cause. Yet, what would it mean for a symbol to cause us
harm?
There are a number of ways to categorize such harms. There are physical harms as well as
mental harms, or harm to communities as well as harm to individuals. Article 9 of the Convention is
very speciﬁc about some of these harms, but not others. For example, uses of religious symbols
can be justiﬁably limited by the state if they destabilize public order (this is a collective harm) or if
they put someone else’s health at risk (a physical harm). The latter is—despite ﬁrst appearances—
a fairly common problem: nurses wearing crosses around their necks, for instance, can be found to
be in breach of health and safety regulations. More difﬁcult to determine, however, are the sorts of
mental harm to individuals that religious symbols can cause. It is no surprise that Article 9 is much
vaguer on this point, specifying that limitations on religious freedoms are justiﬁable only ‘for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.
One strategy taken by legal theorists is just simply to deny that any kind of analysis of harm is
possible when it comes to the speciﬁc instance of religious symbols. Robert Wintemute sometimes
takes this approach (although he also questions it elsewhere), stating simply, ‘I would argue that
[in legal cases involving] religious clothing or symbols […] the individual’s manifestation of their
religious beliefs causes no direct harm to others’. There is, however, another approach often taken
—to treat debates about the right to wear religious symbols as completely analogous to the
discussion of freedom of speech. The harms likely to be caused by religious symbols are, on this
analogy, pretty much the same as the harms caused by hate-speech. But such an analogy is more
often assumed than demonstrated—is it actually the case that symbolism and speech are
comparable in this context?
Take, for example, one of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ that the European Court of Human
Rights has found to be contravened by harmful uses of religious symbols: the freedom of religion
of other individuals. That is, some uses of religious symbols have been judged to interfere with the
ability of other individuals to choose and practise their own religion. This is most obvious in the
classroom: the teacher may wear, privilege, or draw attention to symbols from a particular religion
that are perceived to interfere with the freedom of her pupils to determine their own religion without
undue inﬂuence. The harm thereby caused is categorized as a form of ‘improper proselytizing’.
The question we are pursuing can thus be expressed as follows: can symbols be used to
proselytize in the same way as verbal persuasion can? That is, more speciﬁcally, how can symbols
interfere with other individuals’ right to determine or practise their own religion?
What is at stake here is this very analogy often drawn between hate-speech and harmful uses of
religious symbols. And it is noticeable that this analogy is put into question in the very court cases
themselves. Here is a passage from the judgement of one of the most controversial cases heard at
the European Court of Human Rights in recent times, Lautsi v Italy:
A cruciﬁx on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point is of importance in the
Court’s view […] It cannot be deemed to have an inﬂuence on pupils comparable to that of
didactic speech or participation in religious activities.
The Lautsi case concerned cruciﬁxes displayed on the walls of state-school classrooms in Italy. A
parent committed to secularism challenged their presence on the grounds that they interfered with
her children’s right to determine their religious identity free from undue inﬂuence (a ‘negative
freedom of religion’). Initially in 2009, the European Court of Human Rights decided in favour of
the secularist parent that such cruciﬁxes constitute ‘powerful external symbols’—that is, they are
likely to be perceived as a form of improper proselytizing by the Italian state, an attempt unduly to
inﬂuence the freedom to determine beliefs that the children enjoy. The Court was here following an
earlier judgement, Dahlab v Switzerland, in which it had similarly endorsed the Swiss
Government’s view that a Muslim headscarf worn by a teacher of young pupils was a ‘powerful’
symbol that could unduly inﬂuence the consciences of vulnerable children.
The quotation above is from the second hearing of the Lautsi case, which—following interventions
from the Vatican, the Polish Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Moscow
and ten national governments—overturned the original judgement: the cruciﬁxes in the classroom
were now not a powerful instance of improper state proselytism. Very clearly indicated in the
second sentence of the above quotation is that part of the reason behind this new decision was
that the judges now argued that the cruciﬁx on the classroom wall was not to be understood in
analogy with ‘didactic speech’ or forced ‘participation in religious observances’. That is, the
judgement implies that while it is easily comprehensible that speech (to take just the ﬁrst instance)
can be an instance of proselytizing, it is doubtful that religious symbols can. Speech and
symbolism are not ‘comparable’, this second judgement claims.
This forceful distinction between the effects of the cruciﬁx and those of didactic speech calls into
question precisely that analogy frequently, if complacently, made between symbolism and free
speech. The judgement claims that the cruciﬁx on a wall cannot cause the same type of harm (or,
perhaps, it cannot cause this harm to the same extent) as didactic speech. Speech that intends to
persuade or convert and contains material concerned with persuading or converting is more
‘powerful’ (to use a term mentioned above), that is, it interferes more with other individuals’
freedom of religion.
Nevertheless, a new problem now emerges: the European Court of Human Rights has concluded
that (in speciﬁc circumstances) an Islamic headscarf worn by a primary-school teacher is in
principle harmful because it is ‘powerful’ enough to interfere with children’s freedom of conscience,
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whereas a cruciﬁx on the classroom wall is not harmful in this way. Whatever the sense behind this
distinction, the political message it sends is surely unhelpful.
On the one hand, then, the sense behind this difference in treatment lies partly in the fact that inDahlab, since it is the teacher who wore a headscarf, then the teacher—and so (to some extent)
the teaching—was to be identiﬁed as religious, whereas a cruciﬁx on the classroom wall need not
identify the teaching itself as religious. Something like this ultimately does differentiate Dahlab’s
headscarf from the Italian cruciﬁx (as too does the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘margin of
appreciation’ doctrine—that latitude should be given to different nation states to deal with these
issues in different ways). However, on the other hand, it remains the case that Christian symbols
have been disentwined from the problematic hate-speech analogy in Strasbourg jurisprudence in a
way that Islamic symbols (and other manifestations of Islam) have not. Perhaps the best course of
action here is critically to return to the judgement of Dahlab v Switzerland. While the European
Court of Human Rights may have been right to have judged that the headscarf in Dahlab was a
signiﬁcant expression of a belief laid out in the Koran, this does not (at least, in any straightforward
way) mean that the headscarf transmits, exhibits, or explicitly persuades people of such beliefs in
the way ‘didactic speech’ might. To conceive the harm caused by religious symbols as analogous
to that caused by hate-speech is not only problematic when it comes to state-sanctioned Christian
symbolism, but also when it comes to the clothing worn by Muslim women—and this is something
that the European Court of Human Rights has yet to acknowledge.
Daniel Whistler is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. He wrote this postwith the assistance of Daniel J. Hill, who is also Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University ofLiverpool. It is based on a their chapter ‘Philosophy of Law and Religion’, in The Research
Handbook on Interdisciplinary Approaches to Law and Religion, edited by Norman Doe, RussellSandberg and Caroline Williams (Elgar Press, 2017). This research also informs their co-writtenbook, The Right to Wear Religious Symbols (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
Image credit: Allégorie de la loi française de Séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat (1905)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
